Using extensive behavioral and archival data on Forbes 1000 directors and CEOs, we find appointments that provide directors with strategic product-market and international-market knowledge and perspective to predict their contribution to strategic decision making; the simple number of board interlocks has no effect on director monitoring and advice-giving.
INTRODUCTION
Theory and research on corporate governance have focused largely on directors' independence and power to explain their involvement in strategic decision making and organizational behavior. However, little attention has been given to whether board members have the appropriate knowledge and perspective to use such influence well -as might be demonstrated by their involvement in the monitoring and advising of top management on strategic issues. For instance, many studies have proposed that boards are most able to contribute to strategy when a large proportion of board seats are held by "independent" or "outside" directors. A complementary perspective maintains that boards have the greatest power to fulfill these responsibilities when their members hold multiple directorships (Mizruchi, 1996) .
In contrast, critics question if directors have suitable knowledge or information to contribute meaningfully to strategy, or how they can be adequately prepared to participate effectively in board discussions when their time and attention is divided and diluted by their other board appointments (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) . Despite the importance of the above questions, very little research has directly examined the extent to which independent boards actually monitor and advise top management team (TMT) strategic decision making, or the degree to which independence or multiple appointments figure into such monitoring and advising. Thus, it has only speculated on the actual processes and problems accompanying board independence or multiple directorships. In order to address such important questions, we therefore introduce a sociocognitive perspective of board process that shows how directors' external appointments impact their ability to monitor and advise top management.
Sociocognive perspective of board process
The sociocognitive perspective developed in this study suggests the potential importance of directors' network of appointments to other boards in determining whether they have the appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to monitor and advise management in the strategic decision making process. As noted above, critics of corporate governance have typically argued that directors' appointments to other boards reduce their ability to contribute to decision making at the focal board. This assumes that knowledge and perspective gained on other boards are largely irrelevant to decision making at the focal firm. In contrast, our sociocognitive perspective indicates how knowledge and perspective acquired from experience on other boards can enhance or diminish directors' ability to contribute to strategy, by focusing their attention on more or less relevant strategic issues.
The sociocognitive perspective on organizational decision making suggests that individuals cope with complex decision making tasks by relying upon the schemata or "knowledge structures" they have developed about their environment (Walsh, 1995: 281) . In the absence of complete information, or given uncertainty regarding the relevance of different pieces of information, individuals tend to follow a top-down or theory-driven approach to decision making, rather than a bottom-up or data-driven approach based on present information (Ocasio, 1997) . Given the extreme information complexity facing directors in evaluating strategic decisions (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) , they can be expected to rely heavily upon the implicit theories they have developed regarding corporate strategy and the competitive environment. Moreover, from this perspective, the knowledge structures that individuals use to cope with information processing demands are developed from experience in the same or similar role (Walsh, 1995) .
In our framework, directors are likely to use knowledge structures developed from their experience on other boards. The literature on interlocking directorates supports this view. This work demonstrates how the involvement of directors on other boards provides an important source of information about business practices and policies (Mizruchi, 1996) . For example, Useem (1982) observed that executives use their board appointments as a way to scan the environment for timely and pertinent information. He quotes several executives who suggest that board appointments provide a vehicle for learning: i.e., "direct involvement in other companies' affairs replaces an awful lot of reading…it's a hell of a tool for top management education" (1982: 209-210) . Similarly, directors can learn about the efficacy of different practices and how to implement them properly by observing the consequences of management decisions. Such learning is particularly vivid because directors observe the decision making process first-hand by giving advice to management, and then witnessing the consequences of those decisions.
Directors also learn about business practices through their communication with other directors in board and committee meetings. Information acquired from fellow directors is particularly influential because it comes from a trusted source (Useem, 1982) . This information is often more timely and up-to-date than that derived from secondary sources, and it may also be more salient due to its recency (Walsh, 1995) . Thus, a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement emphasizes how directors' social structural context, including their ties to other boards, provides direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors, which in turn can critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on the focal board.
Related board ties in stable environments
Environmental stability refers to the extent to which a firm's competitive environment is complex, uncertain, and prone to strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993) . It is emphasized here because such stability is a key determinant of the particular strategic issues facing a firm and its top management (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993) . Accordingly, the level of stability vs. turbulence in the environment may be an important factor in determining how directors can contribute to strategic decision making. Theory and research on environmental turbulence and strategic decision making distinguishes between two basic strategic issues in the decision making process --the development of new strategies and the implementation of existing strategies --and suggests that in stable environments the latter issue is relatively more important: if there is less change in the environment, there is less need to regularly identify new strategic alternatives in order to maintain fit with the environment, so that firms in stable environments are more likely to compete primarily through the better implementation of existing strategies (Ginsberg, 1990) . Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) explicitly recognize board monitoring of strategy implementation as an important component of the board's obligation to protect shareholders.
How then might directors' ties to other boards enhance their ability to monitor and advise management on the implementation of existing strategies in stable environments? We suggest that directors will be better able to contribute to strategy in such environments to the extent that their board ties are strategically related to the focal firm. Strategically related board ties refer to a director's appointments to boards of other companies that follow similar strategies and operate in similar product-market and international-market contexts. Given that such ties enable directors to observe first-hand the experiences of other firms in implementing similar strategies, they provide directors with a more sophisticated understanding of the combination of systems and structures needed for successful implementation of the firm's strategy. Moreover, strategically related board ties also help directors acquire relevant knowledge through social interaction with other directors in board and committee meetings, as board members evaluate management decision making and raise ideas and suggestions for better implementation.
Specifically, it is proposed that for firms in stable environments, outside directors' board appointments to other firms pursuing related international and product-market strategies will be positively associated with such desireable director behaviors as (1) the level of board monitoring, (2) the level of board advice-giving, and (3) directors' self-perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. This proposition stems from the observation that stable environments create conditions under which directors' primarily provide expertise on the effective implementation of current strategies (Ginsberg, 1990) . Moreover, directors who have ties to firms pursuing related strategies are likely to achieve knowledge-economies of scope or information-processing multiplier effects in monitoring and advising other firms that are implementing similar strategies. Therefore, as summarized by the following hypothesis, such related ties are argued to increase outside directors' capacity to contribute to strategic decision making. H1: In stable environments, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments to other firms are strategically related to the focal firm, the greater will be (a) directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions, (b) the level of board monitoring, and (c) advice-giving on strategic issues.
Heterogeneous board ties in unstable environments
In contrast, for firms facing turbulent environments it is proposed that the above director behaviors will obtain when board ties are to other firms pursuing "complementary" strategies (i.e., a heterogeneous mix of related and unrelated international and product market strategies). Such heterogeneity is argued here to provide directors with beneficial information and expertise regarding both the implementation of current strategies and the modification of strategies in response to environmental change (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) . Consequently, while strategy implementation remains a critical contingency for these firms, environmental turbulence increases the importance of understanding when environmental change is needed, and how feasible particular changes may be given firms' current resource base --information likely to be provided by director appointments to firms pursuing alternative strategies. Therefore, as summarized in the following hypothesis, under turbulent conditions directors' appointments to firms pursuing complementary strategies are argued to increase their involvement in strategic decision making.
H2: In unstable environments, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments to other firms are complementary in their relatedness to the focal firm, the greater will be (a) directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions, (b) the level of board monitoring, and (c) advice-giving on strategic issues.
METHOD
The sociocognitive propositions offered above are supported by a unique data set that combines archival reports with behavioral data obtained through surveys of Fortune 1000 executives. Extensive pretesting was undertaken resulting in the receipt of complete surveys from 263 CEOs and 564 outside directors (n=263 firms). Data for the three dependent variables --board monitoring, board advice giving, and perceived director contribution --were gathered in the surveys through multi-item scales that demonstrated high reliability and no sample selection bias. Data on environmental stability, international and product-market relatedness and complementarity were gathered from archival sources. Both hypotheses were tested while controlling for directors' level of education, level and breadth of technical and management experience, tenure, number of board ties (direct and indirect), and board independence (portion of the board comprised of the CEO's personal friends and portion of the board appointed after the CEO); we also controlled for firm diversification, internationalization, size, performance, CEO duality, and CEO ownership.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Hypotheses were tested using OLS regression, with the sample split among firms in stable and unstable environments. We first used the product term approach to test the interaction effects between environmental (in)stability and board appointments. The results of these analyses were consistent with the results of the split-sample analyses discussed below. Moreover, results were identical across separate measures of environmental uncertainty (i.e., changes in industry concentration and stock price volatility).
Results of OLS regression testing H1 supported the prediction that related appointments would be positively associated with directors' perceptions of their ability to contribute to board discussions, and the level of board monitoring and advice giving in stable environments. The coefficients for product-market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness were all positive and significant. And while the coefficient for foreign-market relatedness was not significant, it was positive as hypothesized. Conversely, the results indicated that having more board appointments to firms with different strategies reduced directors' involvement in strategic decision making. The results held after controlling for complementarity in strategic relatedness, which was unrelated to directors' monitoring and advice-giving in stable environments.
Hypothesis H2 predicts that, in unstable environments, the more a director's board appointments complemented the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the greater would be the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. OLS regression results showed that complementarity in strategic relatedness is positively related to directors' perceived ability to contribute for all four dimensions of corporate strategy. At the same time, the results show that simple relatedness does not predict the ability to contribute. Consistent with our other predictions for unstable environments, the greater the heterogeneity of directors' board appointments in terms of product market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness, the higher the level of board monitoring and advice-giving. Heterogeneity in foreign market relatedness is also marginally associated with advice-giving in such environments. These results hold after controlling for the simple relatedness of board ties, which was generally unrelated to either kind of involvement. Thus, the results consistently show that the strategic relatedness of board ties increases involvement in stable environments but not in unstable environments, while the opposite pattern emerged in unstable environments.
Beyond the theoretical importance of this research, its results have significant implications for both public policy and business practice. For instance, as exemplified by Business Week's recent focus on the "best" and "worst" boards, there is growing external pressure to legislate constraints on board member appointments. To the extent that such constraints reduce firms' ability to realize the informational benefits accruing from the types of external appointments discussed in this research, legislated board constraints may have negative unintended consequences for the efficacy of corporate governance in public US firms. Similarly, while there is some evidence that corporate leaders have traditionally given considerable weight to the number of other board memberships held by director candidates in selecting new directors onto the board, the results of this study suggest the need to consider whether a director connects the firm with other organizations that can furnish relevant strategic knowledge, rather than simply focusing on the number of boards seats the director already holds.
For example, the results of this study suggest that if a firm's board is comprised primarily of outside directors that sit on other boards with similar strategies, and the firm's industry is becoming increasingly turbulent, then such a board's capability to monitor and advise the firm would be enhanced considerably by appointing directors with ties to firms that follow different diversification and internationalization strategies in different product and geographic markets. In other words, a firm that anticipates entering an industry that is characterized by great competitive instability can proactively choose to diversify its "portfolio" of director ties to includes links with strategically different firms, as well as strategically similar firms, thereby enhancing its board's ability to monitor and advise.
In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest the value of applying sociocognition to theories of corporate governance in order to address whether and when corporate leaders have the information and knowledge to be actively involved in strategic monitoring and advice-giving, and therefore have the capabilities to contribute to corporate governance. Moreover, while little rigorous empirical research has directly examined behavioral processes underlying CEO/board relationships, the findings also show the potential power of models that link the broader, social structural context in which boards are embedded (i.e., through outside directors other board appointments), as well as the environmental conditions that surround them, with microbehavioral processes that occur inside the "black box" of corporate boards.
